An Analysis of Marsy’s Law in Covington Post-Conviction Appeal

In Covington v. Commonwealth, a post-conviction appeal focused on whether Marsy's Law, a constitutional amendment in Kentucky, grants crime victims the right to intervene in criminal proceedings. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky addressed the motion from Sharon Muse-Johnson, the victim in the case, who sought to intervene in an appeal related to Frankie Covington's conviction for kidnapping and being a first-degree persistent felony offender.

Background

Frankie Covington was convicted in 2007 for the kidnapping of Sharon Muse-Johnson, the Commonwealth's Attorney for Bourbon County. Following his trial, Covington was sentenced to life in prison. Several years later, Muse-Johnson published a book titled Kidnapped by a Client: The Incredible True Story of an Attorney's Fight for Justice. Statements in the book raised concerns about the consistency of her testimony during the original trial.

As a result, the Department of Public Advocacy (DPA) initiated a post-conviction investigation and filed a motion for relief under Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02, alleging that Muse-Johnson’s testimony contained inconsistencies. Muse-Johnson responded to this motion under Marsy’s Law, which extends specific rights to victims in Kentucky. However, the DPA moved to strike her response.

The Bourbon Circuit Court, presided over by Special Judge Michael Dean, denied both the DPA's motion for relief and the motion to strike Muse-Johnson's response. The DPA subsequently appealed, and Muse-Johnson filed a motion to intervene on appeal, citing her rights under Marsy's Law.

Marsy’s Law and Victim Intervention

Marsy’s Law was ratified by Kentucky voters in 2020. The amendment provides crime victims with specific rights, including the right to be notified and heard during proceedings related to a defendant's release, plea, or sentencing. However, it does not explicitly grant victims party status in criminal proceedings. In her motion, Muse-Johnson argued that these rights extended to allowing her to intervene in the appeal process, claiming her safety was at risk and that her interests in the appeal were substantial.

The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, ruling that Marsy’s Law did not grant Muse-Johnson the right to intervene. The court emphasized that while Marsy’s Law ensures that victims are heard in specific proceedings, it does not afford them the status of a party in criminal appeals. The court found that her interests were adequately represented by the Attorney General, who argued to uphold Covington’s conviction.

Intervention of Right and Permissive Intervention

Muse-Johnson also argued that she should be allowed to intervene either as of right or through permissive intervention under Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 24.01 and 24.02, respectively. To qualify for intervention of right, she needed to demonstrate that she had a substantial interest in the appeal and that the existing parties could not adequately represent her interests.

The court found that while Muse-Johnson had a personal interest in the appeal, her safety and reputation were not directly at issue in the legal questions being considered. The case was about whether Covington’s conviction was undermined by the inconsistencies in her testimony, not about her personal safety. Furthermore, the Attorney General's participation in the appeal was sufficient to protect her interests.

As for permissive intervention, the court concluded that the legal questions involved were based solely on the trial court record. Muse-Johnson’s statements were already part of the record, and no additional input was necessary. The court determined that allowing her to intervene would not contribute to the legal proceedings.

Court’s Decision

The Court of Appeals denied Muse-Johnson's motion to intervene, ruling that she did not have standing under Marsy’s Law and did not meet the requirements for intervention of right or permissive intervention. As a result, the case proceeded with the Commonwealth and the Department of Public Advocacy as the only parties to the appeal.

Conclusion

The Covington v. Commonwealth case illustrates the limitations of Marsy's Law in post-conviction appeals. While the law provides victims with certain rights, it does not grant them party status in criminal proceedings. The decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals underscores the importance of maintaining the distinction between victims' rights and the responsibilities of the Commonwealth in the legal process.