Legal Analysis: Curtiss v. Kijakazi Social Security Disability Case

In the case of Curtiss v. Kijakazi, Sylvia Curtiss, the plaintiff-appellant, appealed the denial of her social security disability benefits. The appeal was heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, following a prior decision by the District Court of Montana, where Judge Kathleen L. DeSoto presided. Curtiss's appeal arose from the denial of her benefits by the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Kilolo Kijakazi.

Procedural Background

Curtiss initially applied for disability benefits in 2012, citing several medical conditions, including fibromyalgia, cervical degenerative disc disease, sciatica, anxiety, and a personality disorder. During her 2012 application, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) assessed her residual functional capacity (RFC) and determined that she had the capacity to perform light work. Consequently, her application for benefits was denied.

Several years later, Curtiss filed a successive application for disability benefits, submitting new medical evidence to support her claim. In 2020, a different ALJ reviewed her case and assessed an RFC of medium work, ultimately denying her disability benefits once again. Curtiss challenged this decision, arguing that the ALJ had erred in not adopting the prior 2012 RFC assessment and had failed to consider the frequency of her medical appointments in determining her RFC.

Legal Analysis and Findings

The Ninth Circuit reviewed Curtiss's appeal and focused on two primary issues: the ALJ's decision to alter the RFC assessment from the 2012 determination and the alleged error in evaluating the frequency of Curtiss's medical appointments.

The court first addressed Curtiss's contention that the ALJ should have adopted the 2012 RFC assessment. Curtiss argued that the ALJ could not alter the prior RFC finding without evidence of medical improvement. However, the Ninth Circuit disagreed, citing Chavez v. Bowen and Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue to support the principle that an ALJ’s prior findings about a social security applicant's RFC, education, and work experience are entitled to some preclusive effect only when no new and material evidence is presented.

The court noted that nearly all of the medical evidence Curtiss submitted post-dated the 2012 RFC finding. This new evidence, the court determined, constituted new and material evidence, which allowed the ALJ to reconsider the prior RFC determination. Furthermore, the ALJ’s decision to assess a medium work RFC in 2020 was based entirely on this new medical evidence, including evaluations conducted after the 2012 determination. The court also acknowledged that the issuance of Social Security Ruling 16-3p, which impacted the evaluation of subjective symptom testimony, represented a change in the law and regulations that further justified the ALJ’s decision to reassess the RFC.

Next, the Ninth Circuit examined Curtiss's argument regarding the frequency of her medical appointments. Curtiss claimed that the ALJ erred by not evaluating how often she would need to miss work to attend her medical appointments, which she calculated as averaging 2.6 doctor visits per month. The court reviewed the relevant regulations under Social Security Ruling 96-8p, which require an ALJ to consider the effects of treatment, including the frequency of appointments, when determining an individual's RFC.

While the court acknowledged that the ALJ did not explicitly address the frequency of Curtiss's medical appointments in the RFC determination, it found that any such error was harmless. The court emphasized that Curtiss had failed to present evidence that her medical appointments would preclude her from maintaining regular and continuous employment. Specifically, Curtiss did not testify that her appointments would result in work-related absences, nor did her medical providers opine on the issue. Instead, the court pointed out that Curtiss had worked as a cashier for approximately three months, and there was no evidence that the frequency of her medical appointments interfered with her ability to work.

Additionally, the court found that Curtiss terminated her employment not due to her medical conditions or appointment frequency but because she walked off the job in embarrassment after an incident where she accidentally ran into a fixed beam. Based on this record, the court concluded that Curtiss had failed to demonstrate that her treatment would interfere with her gainful employment, thereby affirming the ALJ’s RFC determination.

Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court's decision to uphold the ALJ's denial of Sylvia Curtiss's application for social security disability benefits. The court found that the ALJ's assessment of Curtiss's RFC was supported by substantial evidence, including new and material medical findings, and that any error related to the frequency of her medical appointments was harmless.