Cactus Canyon Quarries Petitions for Review of ALJ Decision

Cactus Canyon Quarries, Inc. operates a non-coal surface mine regulated by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Mine Act). This legislation mandates periodic inspections of mines to ensure compliance with safety standards established by the Secretary of Labor to protect miner health and safety. On May 20, 2013, MSHA conducted an inspection of Cactus Canyon’s mine, led by Inspector Michael Sonney. MSHA issued seven citations to Cactus Canyon for alleged safety standard violations, each citation carrying a proposed penalty of $100.

Under the Mine Act, Cactus Canyon contested these citations before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, seeking to challenge the validity of each alleged violation.

MSHA’s Motion to Vacate Citations and Initial Case Dismissal

The case moved forward, but Inspector Sonney, the individual responsible for issuing the citations, had left MSHA and was unavailable to testify. After unsuccessful settlement negotiations with Cactus Canyon, MSHA vacated the citations entirely and filed a motion with the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to dismiss the proceedings.

Cactus Canyon opposed the Secretary’s motion, filing a “motion for judgment” and requesting either a judgment in its favor or a dismissal “with prejudice,” which would prevent MSHA from reissuing similar citations. The ALJ dismissed the case without indicating whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice.

Application for Attorney Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act

Following the dismissal, Cactus Canyon applied for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). The EAJA provides for attorney fee awards to a “prevailing party” in cases against the federal government unless the government’s position was “substantially justified.” Cactus Canyon argued it had prevailed in the case due to the dismissal of the citations and sought $11,250 in attorney fees, representing 45 hours of legal work billed at an enhanced rate of $250 per hour.

The Secretary of Labor opposed this application, asserting that Cactus Canyon did not meet the EAJA’s requirement of a “prevailing party.” Under the law, a prevailing party is one that obtains an enforceable judgment on the merits or another form of court-sanctioned relief that materially alters the legal relationship between the parties. The Secretary argued that the voluntary dismissal of citations, without a substantive judicial ruling, did not meet this threshold.

The ALJ denied Cactus Canyon’s fee application, finding that Cactus Canyon was not a prevailing party under the EAJA. The ALJ’s decision cited Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, a U.S. Supreme Court case defining prevailing-party status in fee-shifting cases. In Buckhannon, the Court held that a party only “prevails” if it secures an enforceable judgment or court-ordered relief that alters the legal relationship between the parties.

The ALJ concluded that the dismissal of the citations by MSHA did not involve any court-sanctioned relief or judicial ruling. Instead, the citations were vacated unilaterally by the Secretary, leaving the case without any adjudication on the merits of the alleged violations. With no substantive judgment, the ALJ concluded that Cactus Canyon did not qualify as a prevailing party under the EAJA.

Cactus Canyon then sought discretionary review from the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, the agency responsible for adjudicating disputes related to mine safety. The Commission declined to review the ALJ’s decision, allowing the ruling to stand without further comment.

Appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court and Analysis of Prevailing Party Status

Following the Commission’s decision, Cactus Canyon appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The primary issue before the D.C. Circuit was whether Cactus Canyon qualified as a prevailing party eligible for attorney fees under the EAJA, given that the case was dismissed voluntarily by MSHA.

The D.C. Circuit reviewed the case under the legal standards established in Buckhannon, which applies to fee-shifting statutes, including the EAJA. The Buckhannon decision clarified that a party “prevails” when it secures an enforceable judgment or court-ordered consent decree that effects a material alteration in the parties’ legal relationship.

The D.C. Circuit determined that Cactus Canyon’s situation did not meet this standard. The voluntary vacatur of the citations by the Secretary did not alter the legal rights or obligations of either party and lacked the “judicial imprimatur” necessary to create prevailing-party status under the EAJA. As such, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the dismissal did not entitle Cactus Canyon to attorney fees, as it was not a judicially-sanctioned outcome.

Precedent Cited in the D.C. Circuit’s Decision

The Court cited its own precedent in Turner v. National Transportation Safety Board, a 2010 case in which the D.C. Circuit applied Buckhannon to determine that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice does not confer prevailing-party status. In Turner, the agency had withdrawn its complaint, leading to a case dismissal without prejudice. The Court found that, since the withdrawal did not result in a judicially enforceable relief, the plaintiffs were not considered prevailing parties. Drawing on this precedent, the D.C. Circuit concluded that Cactus Canyon’s circumstances were insufficient to meet the prevailing-party standard, as the dismissal lacked any substantive ruling or enforceable legal relief.

Conclusion

The D.C. Circuit affirmed the ALJ’s denial of attorney fees, concluding that Cactus Canyon did not qualify as a prevailing party under the EAJA. This decision underscores that a voluntary agency dismissal without judicial relief does not satisfy the EAJA’s requirement for prevailing-party status. The ruling reinforces the application of Buckhannon in administrative cases, highlighting that only enforceable judgments or court-ordered changes in the legal relationship can establish eligibility for attorney fees under the EAJA.