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Rudisill v. VA: Supreme Court Upholds 48-Month GI Bill Cap Use

an american soldier and his child siting on concrete steps and wrapped in an american flag

In Rudisill v. McDonough, the United States Supreme Court resolved a statutory dispute concerning veterans who are eligible for both Montgomery GI Bill and Post-9/11 GI Bill education benefits. The decision clarified that a veteran with separate entitlements under both programs may access the full benefits of each—up to the 48-month statutory cap—without being subject to additional restrictions, provided no formal election to convert benefits was made.

Background on Military Service and Benefit Eligibility

James R. Rudisill served in the U.S. Army across three distinct periods, totaling nearly eight years of active duty. His first period of service entitled him to benefits under the Montgomery GI Bill, from which he used 25 months and 14 days to complete his undergraduate education. His second and third enlistments qualified him for the more expansive Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits.

When Rudisill later applied to Yale Divinity School, he sought to use his Post-9/11 benefits. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) approved only 10 months and 16 days—matching his unused Montgomery benefit time—on the grounds that he had effectively swapped benefit types under 38 U.S.C. § 3327 and was thus limited to a combined 36 months of use.

Litigation History and Federal Circuit Ruling

Rudisill challenged the VA’s interpretation, asserting that he had earned two separate entitlements and had not opted to coordinate them through the mechanism outlined in § 3327. A panel of the Federal Circuit initially agreed with him, holding that the 48-month cap under § 3695 applied without requiring a benefits conversion. However, an en banc panel reversed that decision, ruling that Rudisill’s request for Post-9/11 benefits constituted an election under § 3327, limiting his entitlement.

Supreme Court Reverses and Clarifies the Law

The Supreme Court, in a 7–2 decision authored by Justice Jackson, reversed the Federal Circuit. The Court held that:

  • Rudisill had earned two distinct entitlements under the Montgomery and Post-9/11 GI Bills.

  • He was permitted to use benefits from either program in any order, up to the 48-month combined limit.

  • He was not required to make a § 3327(a) election unless he sought to convert Montgomery benefits into Post-9/11 benefits.

The Court emphasized that the language in § 3327 applied only to service members electing to swap benefit types, not to those simply using benefits from distinct periods of qualifying service. The VA’s interpretation was deemed inconsistent with the statutory text, which plainly entitled Rudisill to the full use of both benefits, subject only to the overarching 48-month cap.

Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justice Barrett, concurred but expressed broader concerns about the legal basis and potential expansion of the pro-veteran canon of statutory interpretation. Justices Thomas and Alito dissented, asserting that the VA correctly applied the statutory limit based on Rudisill’s election.

Legal Support for Veterans Benefit Entitlements

Understanding veterans' rights to educational assistance can be complicated when multiple benefit programs apply. If you believe your Post-9/11 or Montgomery GI Bill benefits have been wrongly limited, the team at Whitcomb, Selinsky, PC can help you assess your entitlements and challenge improper VA determinations under applicable federal statutes.