Appeal in Rear-End Collision Case: Understanding Court Rulings

In Beard v. Parry, Mark Beard appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of Max Parry following a motor vehicle collision on Interstate 70 near Evergreen, Colorado. The case arose from a rear-end collision involving two westbound vehicles.

Mark Beard was traveling in the center lane of Interstate 70. Max Parry was traveling in the far-right lane. Parry decided to merge into the center lane to pass slow-moving semitrucks ahead of him. According to Parry’s account, traffic in the center lane abruptly stopped as he began merging. He applied his brakes but was unable to avoid striking the rear of Beard’s vehicle. Beard maintained that traffic had only gradually slowed before he was struck from behind. Beard alleged that he sustained injuries as a result of the collision. A state trooper responded to the scene and obtained statements from both drivers.

Beard filed suit asserting claims for negligence and negligence per se, along with other claims that were later dismissed. Before trial, he moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of Parry’s negligence. The trial court denied that motion.

Jury Trial and Verdict

The case proceeded to a five-day jury trial in January 2023. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Parry. The jury found that Beard had sustained injuries, damages, or losses but determined that Parry was not negligent and that any negligence by Parry did not cause Beard’s injuries.

After obtaining extensions of time, Beard filed a post-trial motion seeking judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial. The trial court entered an order denying the motion. Beard appealed.

Timeliness of the Appeal

The Colorado Court of Appeals first addressed whether the appeal was timely. Under Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 59(j), a post-trial motion is deemed denied if not ruled upon within sixty-three days. The appellate court concluded that Beard’s motion was deemed denied by operation of the rule before the trial court entered its written order. Although the later order purporting to rule on the motion was void, the appellate court determined that the appeal was timely because no signed written judgment had entered immediately after trial. The court treated the trial court’s later signed order as the date of judgment for purposes of calculating the appeal deadline and concluded that the notice of appeal was filed within the applicable forty-nine-day period.

Review of the Summary Judgment Ruling

Beard challenged the denial of his pretrial motion for partial summary judgment on negligence. The Court of Appeals concluded that the denial of summary judgment was not reviewable on appeal after a trial on the merits. The court explained that issues raised at summary judgment must instead be preserved through post-trial motions. As a result, the court limited its review to the denial of the post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial.

Post-Trial Motion and Presumption of Negligence

Beard contended that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding that Parry was not negligent. The Court of Appeals reviewed the denial of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict de novo and considered the evidence in the light most favorable to Parry.

In rear-end collisions, Colorado law generally presumes that the rear driver was negligent. The court explained that this presumption may be rebutted by competent evidence showing that the rear driver was not negligent. If such evidence is presented, negligence becomes a question of fact for the jury.

The Court of Appeals identified several pieces of evidence presented at trial that supported submission of the issue to the jury. Parry testified that he was familiar with the route, was not distracted, had his turn signal on, checked his mirrors and blind spot, and attempted to brake when traffic suddenly stopped. The responding trooper testified that there was no indication Parry had been distracted and that Parry reported traveling at approximately forty-five miles per hour in an area with a sixty-five-mile-per-hour speed limit. The trooper also testified that both drivers indicated at the scene that traffic had slowed suddenly and that semitrucks ahead had changed lanes.

The appellate court concluded that this evidence was sufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence and to present a factual question for the jury. Because there was evidence supporting the verdict, the court declined to disturb it.

Jury Instruction on Presumption

Beard also challenged the jury instruction regarding the presumption of negligence. The instruction informed the jury that when a driver hits another vehicle from behind, the law presumes the rear driver was negligent. It further instructed the jury that it could, but was not required to, draw an inference of negligence and could consider that inference along with all other evidence.

Beard argued that the jury should have been instructed that it must find Parry negligent because the presumption had not been rebutted. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, reiterating that sufficient evidence supported instructing the jury on the possibility of rebuttal and allowing the jury to decide the issue.

Exclusion of Evidence on Negligence Per Se

Beard further argued that the trial court erred in excluding certain testimony related to his negligence per se claim. At trial, the state trooper testified as an expert in accident investigation and opined that Parry was at fault because he was following too closely. When Beard’s counsel attempted to question the trooper about whether following too closely violated a specific traffic code provision, Parry objected. The trial court sustained the objection.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The trial court expressed concern that reference to a traffic code provision could lead the jury to speculate about whether Parry had received a citation, which would have been inadmissible in the civil action. The court noted that the jury was instructed on the relevant traffic statutes, including the section addressing following too closely. Given these circumstances, the appellate court determined that the exclusion of additional testimony about the statutory provision was within the trial court’s discretion.

Disposition

The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment entered on the jury’s verdict in favor of Max Parry.

Legal Services

If you were injured in a car accident and have questions about liability, jury findings, or the presumption of negligence in rear-end collisions, Whitcomb, Selinsky PC handles motor vehicle collision claims involving negligence and negligence per se. Contact us to discuss your situation with our team.