Tormod Marc Nesjan, a mechanic, brought a negligence action against J & A Distributing, Inc., Tony Vasquez, and Judith Vasquez after he suffered serious injuries while inspecting a box truck. On May 14, 2021, Tony Vasquez drove the box truck from J & A Distributing’s premises to the driveway of Nesjan’s nearby mechanic shop for inspection of a suspected driveshaft issue.
Before beginning the inspection, Nesjan placed the truck in park, engaged the emergency brake, and positioned wheel chocks under the tires. He then went underneath the truck to examine the driveshaft. During the inspection, the driveshaft came loose, causing the truck to roll backward and over him. Nesjan sustained multiple serious injuries, including fractured ribs, a broken neck, a broken back, and a broken right leg.
On May 14, 2024, exactly three years after the incident, Nesjan filed suit asserting claims for negligence and negligence per se. The claims alleged that J & A Distributing failed to properly maintain the truck in a safe mechanical condition.
J & A Distributing moved to dismiss the complaint under Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5). The motion asserted that the claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations that generally applies to negligence actions under section 13-80-102(1)(a), C.R.S.
Nesjan responded that the three-year statute of limitations applied because his injuries arose out of the use or operation of a motor vehicle under section 13-80-101(1)(n)(I), C.R.S. He asserted that inspecting and diagnosing mechanical issues constituted use of the truck within the meaning of the statute.
The district court granted the motion to dismiss. It concluded that the three-year statute did not apply because the truck was stationary and not in active use or operation at the time of the incident. Because the complaint was filed more than two years after the injury, the court dismissed the action as untimely.
The Court of Appeals reviewed whether the district court applied the correct statute of limitations. The issue centered on whether Nesjan’s injuries arose out of the use or operation of a motor vehicle within the meaning of section 13-80-101(1)(n)(I).
The court reviewed the dismissal de novo and applied established principles of statutory interpretation. When more than one statute of limitations may apply, courts consider which statute is more specific, which was enacted later, and which provides the longer filing period.
The Court of Appeals examined the plain meaning of the word “use,” relying on standard dictionary definitions. It explained that use includes employing an object for the accomplishment of a purpose or putting it into service.
Applying that definition, the court determined that Nesjan was using the box truck when he inspected it. He was hired to diagnose mechanical issues, and his actions were directly connected to returning the truck to a condition suitable for transportation. The court emphasized that maintenance and inspection activities are closely related to a vehicle’s inherent purpose because only operational vehicles can be used to transport people or cargo.
The court rejected the argument that a vehicle must be moving or actively driven to be in use. It relied on prior Colorado cases interpreting identical statutory language in other contexts, which recognized that a vehicle may be in use even when stationary, so long as the activity is not foreign to the vehicle’s inherent purpose.
The court also examined the history of section 13-80-101. It explained that the General Assembly added subsection (1)(n)(I) to ensure that tort actions arising out of motor vehicle use were governed by a three-year limitations period. This amendment responded to earlier decisions that created uncertainty about which limitations period applied to motor vehicle-related claims.
The court concluded that the statutory history supported a broad interpretation of the phrase “use or operation of a motor vehicle,” consistent with earlier insurance-coverage cases and the legislature’s intent to apply the longer limitations period to motor vehicle-related injuries.
The Court of Appeals held that Nesjan’s injuries arose out of the use of a motor vehicle. Because his negligence claims were filed within three years of the accident, the district court erred in dismissing the case as untimely. The court reversed the dismissal and remanded the matter to the district court with instructions to reinstate the complaint.
If you’ve experienced injuries arising from a motor vehicle incident, Whitcomb Selinsky PC handles motor vehicle collision matters. Reach out to our team through our contact page to learn how our team can assist with your claim.