Matthew Shive entered into a membership agreement with 24 Hour Fitness USA, LLC, which granted him access to the company’s athletic clubs. The agreement included an exculpatory clause addressing risks associated with using 24 Hour’s facilities and participating in activities offered there. The clause stated that using the facilities involved a risk of injury. It further stated that the member accepted those risks and released 24 Hour from liability for injuries or other damages resulting from the actions or inactions, including negligence, of the company or anyone acting on its behalf. The clause referenced claims involving negligence, premises liability, and products liability, and it concluded by noting that 24 Hour provided recreational services.
After signing this agreement, Shive used one of the company’s facilities for exercise. On a winter day, he exited the building and walked onto a sidewalk outside the club’s entrance. Snow and ice had accumulated there. Shive slipped on ice under an awning extending over the sidewalk near the entrance. He sustained a significant knee injury.
Shive filed a claim under Colorado’s Premises Liability Act. He stated that 24 Hour unreasonably failed to exercise reasonable care by not removing, mitigating, or maintaining the area where ice had accumulated. He asserted that the company knew or should have known about the dangerous condition.
24 Hour moved for summary judgment, asserting that the exculpatory clause barred the Premises Liability Act claim. Shive responded that the clause could not reasonably be interpreted to apply to injuries from a fall on an exterior sidewalk. He stated that the language of the clause would lead a member to understand it as covering risks inherent in using the club’s equipment and participating in activities within the facility.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 24 Hour. It concluded that the exculpatory clause was clear and broad and released 24 Hour from liability for all injuries, whether related to exercise or not. It reasoned that entering and exiting the club was connected to using the facility. Because the clause referenced premises liability claims, the district court determined that the release covered this incident. The court dismissed the case with prejudice.
On appeal, Shive challenged the district court’s ruling under the fourth factor of the Jones v. Dressel framework, which requires courts to determine whether the parties expressed an intention to extinguish liability in clear and unambiguous language. The Court of Appeals reviewed the issue de novo.
The Court of Appeals discussed Jones and several other cases addressing exculpatory agreements, including Miller v. Crested Butte, LLC, Stone v. Life Time Fitness, Inc., and Doe v. Wellbridge Club Management LLC. These cases examined how courts evaluate whether a release clearly communicated that the parties intended to bar specific claims. The Court of Appeals focused on whether the language allowed a member to understand the full scope of the release without confusion.
The court compared the clause in Shive’s agreement to those in the cited cases. In Miller, the clause expressly mentioned risks associated with using ski lifts, including misloading and falling. In Stone, the clause focused on risks inherent in fitness activities, which did not clearly extend to tripping over a hair dryer cord in a locker room. In Doe, the clause focused on athletic activities and did not address unrelated risks.
The Court of Appeals evaluated whether the term “facilities,” as used in the agreement, included the exterior sidewalk where Shive fell. The language of the exculpatory clause described risk associated with using 24 Hour’s facilities, and other portions of the membership agreement used “facilities” to refer to indoor spaces accessible only to members. The sidewalk outside the entrance was publicly accessible.
Because the clause’s references to using the facilities centered on recreational services inside the building, the court determined that a member would reasonably understand the clause as applying to indoor spaces. The clause did not clearly extend to outdoor areas where recreational services were not offered.
The Court of Appeals also reviewed 24 Hour’s argument that including premises liability in the clause expanded its scope to incidents occurring outside the building. The court found that the limiting language tied the waiver to injuries sustained while using the facilities. The clause did not clearly and unambiguously waive liability for injuries occurring outside the facility.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the exculpatory clause did not clearly express an intention to waive liability for Shive’s slip-and-fall claim. Because the language did not unambiguously extend to the location of the injury, the clause was unenforceable under the fourth Jones factor with respect to this incident. The court reversed the summary judgment ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.
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