Matthew Shive brought a claim under Colorado’s Premises Liability Act after slipping on ice outside a 24 Hour Fitness location. The Colorado Court of Appeals reviewed the membership agreement he signed, the exculpatory clause it contained, and the district court’s decision granting summary judgment to the club. The appellate record outlined the language of the agreement, the circumstances of the fall, and the legal standards governing exculpatory clauses. After examining the agreement as a whole, the division determined whether the clause clearly and unambiguously barred Shive’s claim.
Shive signed a preprinted membership agreement that included an exculpatory clause. The clause stated that using 24 Hour Fitness facilities involved risks that varied across activities and could result in a range of injuries. It said that members accepted these risks and agreed that the company would not be liable for injuries or damages resulting from the actions or inactions of the company or anyone using the facilities. It also listed negligence, premises liability, and products liability among the claims included.
According to the record, Shive completed a workout and exited the building on a winter day. Snow and ice had accumulated on the sidewalk directly in front of the entrance. He slipped beneath an awning that extended over a publicly accessible portion of the sidewalk and injured his knee. The images and text on page 1 show the location and the court’s summary of the event. 24 Hour Fitness did not dispute that the fall took place outside the building on an area that members and nonmembers alike could use.
Shive filed a claim alleging that the company failed to exercise reasonable care in maintaining the area and that it should have removed or mitigated the ice near the entrance. 24 Hour Fitness moved for summary judgment, arguing that the membership agreement barred the claim.
The district court focused on the fourth factor from the Jones v. Dressel framework, which concerns whether an agreement clearly and unambiguously expresses an intent to extinguish liability. The court found that the clause’s language was broad and that it included a waiver of premises liability claims. It concluded that because entering and exiting the club was related to the use of the facility, Shive had waived his claim.
Shive appealed, asserting that the clause did not cover a fall on a sidewalk outside the building and that the district court applied the fourth Jones factor too broadly.
The division reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo and interpreted the contract as a question of law. The opinion compared the language of the clause to that in several earlier cases involving athletic clubs and recreational facilities. It analyzed whether a member would reasonably understand the term “facilities” to include publicly accessible sidewalks.
The record, including the discussion on pages 6 and 7, reflected that the clause tied its waiver to injuries sustained while using 24 Hour Fitness facilities or participating in its activities. The final sentence of the clause described the company as providing recreational services, reinforcing the connection between the waiver and injuries arising from those services.
The panel also examined other parts of the membership agreement. Sections describing access to facilities and services referred to spaces that members, not the general public, could enter. These provisions informed the court’s interpretation of the term “facilities.”
The appellate court concluded that the clause did not extend to the sidewalk where Shive fell. It noted several features:
The clause framed risks in terms of the use of the club’s facilities and participation in its activities.
“Facilities” referred to areas members accessed for recreation, such as gym floors, pools, courts, or locker rooms.
The sidewalk was not part of these member‑only spaces.
The clause did not clearly express an intent to waive claims arising from conditions on a publicly accessible sidewalk.
The images and text on page 7 emphasized that the clause’s wording limited its scope to situations arising within member‑use spaces. The division compared this clause to those in other cases in which courts held that releases did not extend beyond risks inherent to fitness activities or the use of athletic equipment.
Because the clause did not clearly and unambiguously waive liability for injuries occurring outside the building, the division determined it could not bar Shive’s claim.
The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s summary judgment ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.
If you were injured because of a hazardous condition on someone else’s property and have questions about your rights, our team at Whitcomb Selinsky PC assists individuals navigating premises liability matters. To learn how we may support your case, visit our premises liability page.